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sons: (1) the evidence establishing use and possession in Parsons
was inconsistent with a hostile claim of ownership and so did not
raise such a presumption, and (2) Parsons' deception in allowing
defendant to believe the disputed land belonged to him was in no
way chargeable to plaintiff or his predecessor. Thus, the court
followed the general rule that an adverse claimant, in order to
fulfill the requirement of hostile possession, must do some positive
act so as to serve notice on the record owner that the former is
claiming exclusive ownership of the property. 5 For the court to
decide otherwise would be to hold that Gilbert by his own act of
erecting a division fence wholly on his own land defeated his own




Texas. Humble Oil & Refining Company v. Atwood' probably
represents the last in a series of suits filed by the plaintiffs in
this case. They, along with other heirs, inherited the King Ranch,
which was for a time administered by trustees. Three suits were
prosecuted to judgment in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, all styled Atwood v. Kleberg.2 Among
other things, these suits attacked the validity of oil and gas leases
executed by the trustees. In the litigation in the federal courts the
validity of the leases was upheld. Subsequently the Atwoods
brought the instant action in the state court.
The facts of the case are relatively simple. The trustees of the
King Ranch gave a mortgage (deed of trust in form) on the ranch
to Humble Oil and Refining Company as security for a loan of
several million dollars. At the same time, and as additional con-
15 See authorities cited in 1 Am. JUR. Adverse Possession, § 130.
1 ........... Tex . .-------- , 244 S. W . 2d 637 (1951).
Equity Actions Nos. 74 (on appeal, 163 F. 2d 108 (5th Cir. 1947)), 102 and 101
(on appeal, 133 F. 2d 69 (5th Cir. 1943), and on rehearing, 135 F. 2d 452 (5th Cir.
1943)).
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sideration or inducement for the making of the loan, the trustees
gave Humble an oil and gas lease on the mortgaged properties,
for which annual rental was to be paid by Humble. The Atwoods
as plaintiffs contended that it was understood that the lease was
additional security for the loan, and not an independent transac-
tion, and that repayment of the loan would terminate the lease.
The Texas Supreme Court found no such intention expressed in
the instruments and refused to admit parol evidence to establish
such intent.
In a scholarly opinion in which he summarized the development
of the Texas law on mortgages and security, Justice Wilson, writ-
ing for the court, held that an oil and gas lease cannot be both a
mortgage and a grant of minerals, that in this case it was a grant
of minerals and nothing else, and that repayment of the debt
secured by the deed of trust terminated the mortgage but did not
terminate the oil and gas lease.
Under the strict English rule against fetters8 the Atwoods might
successfully have contended that upon repayment of the loan they
were entitled to receive the property back in the same form as when
it was mortgaged-free from the oil and gas lease. There would
have been no question of intent, interpretation of the instruments,
or the introduction of parol evidence, for under the strict English
rule any provision purporting to deprive the mortgagor of his
right to receive the property back in the same form in which it
existed prior to the mortgage would have been struck down. This
rigid rule has been modified even in England, and it has not been
applied in the United States.4 It is important, nevertheless, to rec-
ognize that English equity courts did at one time invalidate any
bargain binding the mortgaged property beyond the redemption
period, for this shows an underlying equitable principle in support
of the Atwoods' claim.
The main argument advanced by the plaintiffs was that the
3 OSBORNE, MORTGAGES (1951) § 99.
'Ibid.
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defeasance clause in the deed of trust required a termination of
the oil and gas lease when the land was freed from the mortgage,
the lease having been executed as a part of the consideration for
the loan secured by the mortgage. It was contended that, since
the presence of a defeasance clause in the deed of trust made the
understanding of the parties a question for the court, parol evi-
dence was unnecessary to establish that the lease was in effect a
grant with a determining condition as expressed in the defeasance
clause. This contention was based on the argument that any instru-
ments forming all or a part of the consideration for the loan must
be construed with the deed of trust, thus bringing the oil and gas
lease within the operation of the defeasance clause. This seems an
unwarranted inference based upon a strained interpretation of
the holdings in several Texas cases cited by the plaintiffs.' These
cases established the rule that where two or more instruments are,
when taken together, a mortgage, they must be construed as one
to give that result. Whether the defeasance clause is provided for
in the same instrument as the conveyance of an interest is not
material. It does not follow, however, that in the principal case
the defeasance clause applied to the lease merely because the
mortgage and the lease were executed at the same time and the
lease was granted as a part of the consideration for the loan. In-
deed, the terms of the lease negatived rather than supported such
a view.
Since there is no rule of law or equity now in effect which would
prevent the mortgagor from executing a lease to the mortgagee
as a separate transaction, or to a third party subject to the mort-
gage, it seems that the Atwoods' argument that the defeasance
clause in the deed of trust automatically applies to the lease is
untenable. In other words, proof of the intention of the parties
would be required. The court held that oral evidence to prove that
the parties intended the lease to terminate when the loan was re.
5 Boatright v. Peck, 33 Tex. 68 (1870) ; Walker v. Wilmore, 212 S. W. 655 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1919), and others.
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paid would be inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. The
question is thus raised whether the ruling was too strict an applica-
tion of the rule in view of the overriding equitable principle that
operation of the parol evidence rule shall not rob a borrower of
his equity of redemption.
For some time after the decision in McMurry v. Mercer' parol
evidence to establish that alleged deeds were actually mortgages
was received only when the consideration was non-contractual.
This restruction has since been eliminated, the supreme court in
Bradshaw v. McDonald' reaffirming the decision in Austin v. Aus-
tin' that parol evidence is admissible to show that a deed contain-
ing contractual consideration was a mortgage. Regardless of the
type of consideration, the introduction of parol evidence would
seem to be admissible to prevent anything approximating a strict
foreclosure, under which a necessitous borrower would be placed
in a position where he could not exercise his equity of redemption.
Several statements in the opinion show that an arrangement
whereby the leases would terminate upon repayment of the debt
would be most illogical and unwise from Humble's viewpoint. It
would put Humble in the position of the risk-taker (in drilling
for oil and gas), while the lessor-mortgagor would be able to use
royalties in case of production to repay the debt and cut off Hum-
ble's right to share in the profits flowing from the production
achieved by its exploratory work. This would be a most unusual
and unlikely situation, but there seems to be no reason why the
court should refuse to let the mortgagor-lessor attempt to prove
by parol evidence that this had been the arrangement intended
by the parties. The points made by the court would, of course, be
effective arguments in negativing such an arrangement, but the
fact that the situation is unlikely and the proof difficult seems an
insufficient reason to exclude parol evidence.
The court recognized that an absolute deed is not the only in-
6 73 S. W. 2d 1087 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
7147 Tex. 455, 216 S. W. 2d 972 (1949).
8 143 Tex. 29, 182 S. W. 2d 355 (1944).
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